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CONTRACTS-CONFLICT OF LAWS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCETELEPHONE
In 1926 plaintiff insurance broker went to New York and there made an
oral offer to defendant's agent to place certain reinsurance contracts with
defendant insurance company in exchange for a five per cent commission on
all premiums collected on policies. The agent deferred acceptance until he
could secure authority from his home office. Plaintiff returned to Philadelphia,
and the agent subsequently telephoned from New York and accepted the offer.
In 1953 defendant notified plaintiff that it no longer felt bound by the contract.
Defendant contended that under the New York Statute of Frauds, oral contracts not to be performed within one year were unenforceable. Plaintiff
argued that the contract was made in Pennsylvania where the acceptance was
heard, and that the New York statute was, therefore, not applicable. Held:
when a contract is entered into by telephone, it is deemed to be made at the
place where the acceptance is spoken and not where the offeror hears the acceptance. The case was remanded to determine the state from which the defendant
telephoned his acceptance since the law of that state would apply. Linn v.
Employers ReinsuranceCorp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638 (1958).
This is the first case in Pennsylvania deciding the situs of a bilateral contract formed by telephone. Although the decision is in accord with those other
state' and federal 2 jurisdictions which have decided the question, it is contrary
to the results reached by the English courts 3 and the textwriters.4
Under the normal conflict of law rules, to determine the formal validity
of a contract between parties from different states, it is essential to establish
where the alleged contract was made.' Usually it is said to be made at the place
where the last act necessary to make a binding agreement takes place." Gen' Carbon v. Hampton, 21 Ala. App. 438, 109 So. 176 (1926); Bank of Yolo v. Sperry Flour
Co., 141 Cal. 314, 74 Pac. 855 (1903); Pearson v. Electric Service Co., 166 Kan. 300, 201 P. 2d
717 (1943); Trinity Ins. Co. v. Mills, 293 Ky. 463, 169 S.W. 2d 311 (1943); Dudley A. Tyng
& Co. v. Converse, 180 Mich. 195, 146 N.W. 629 (1914); Estrum v. Union Cas. Life Ins. Co.,
165 Neb. 554, 86 N.W. 2d 568 (1957);

Keegan v. Lenzie, 171 Or. 194, 135 P. 2d 717 (1943);

Traders Oil Mill Co. v. Arnold Bros. Gin Co., 225 S.W. 2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
2 Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihoffer Baking Co., 255 F. 2d 641, (3d Cir. 1958); Rothenburg
v. Rothstein, 181 F. 2d 345 (3d Cir. 1949); Joseph v. Krull Wholesale Drug Co., 147 F. Supp.
250 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United States v. Bushwick Mills, 165 F. 2d 198 (2d Cir. 1947).
3 Entores, Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp., [1955] 2 All E.R. 493 (A.C.).
41 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 79 (1950);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 82 (rev. ed. 1936);
Winfield, Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance, 55 L. Q. REV. 499, 513 (1939).
5 Except for contracts concerning land, the validity of a contract as affected by the Statute
of Frauds is generally held to be a matter of substance to be determined by the law of the place
of contracting and not a matter relating to proof to be governed by the lex fori. Bernstein v.
Lipper, 307 Pa. 36, 160 AtI. 770 (1932); Callaway v. Prettyman, 218 Pa. 293, 67 Atl. 418 (1907);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (1934).
6Victorson v. Albert M. Green Hosiery Mills, Inc., 202 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1953); In re
Luce's Estate, 54 York 119 (O.C., 1940); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 74 (1932).
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erally, there is no difficulty in determining what is the last act necessary for the
formation of a unilateral contract, which comes into existence when the act
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise is performed; the place
of contracting is the place where the act occurs.' Difficulties arise in determining
the last act necessary for the formation of a bilateral contract because there are
two different rules establishing contrary conclusions. It is necessary to examine
the theories underlying each rule.
One requirement of an informal bilateral contract is a manisfestation of
mutual assent, almost invariably taking the form of an offer on the one hand
and an acceptance on the other.8 Two manifestations of willingness to make
the same bargain do not constitute a contract unless one is made with reference
to the other, and therefore, it is essential to the agreement that there be communication of the offer? Since the very essence of a bilateral contract is an exchange of promises,'0 communication of acceptance is also essential." This
has been the general rule, both in the United States 12 and England," where the
bargaining has been in the presence of both parties. The hearing of the offeror
is the last act necessary for the formation of the contract.
On the other hand, an apparent exception to the general rule arises
where the parties are negotiating at a distance from each other. In such a
situation some indirect mode of communication must be employed. Four such
indirect means have been commonly used-mail, telegraph, telephone, and
teleprinter.' 4 Two of these modes create an appreciable time difference between the offer and acceptance. Use of any of these communication systems
introduces a possibility of error or failure in transmission which does not
exist where the negotiations are carried on face to face. When confronted
with the problem of where and at what moment a contract is formed, the courts
attempted to rationalize the holding of the leading British case of Adams v.
7 Packard Englewood Motors v. Packard Motor Car Co., 215 F. 2d 503 (3d Cir. 1954);
Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 324.
8 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 20, 22.
9 T. M. James & Sons v. Marion Fruit Jar & Bottle Co., 69 Mo. App. 207 (1896); Jersey
City v. Harrison, 72 N.J.L. 185, 62 Atl. 765 (1905); Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 100 Tex. 375, 99
S.W. 1111 (1907); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 23. Contra, Asinof v. Freudenthal, 195 App.
Div. 79, 186 N.Y.S. 383 (1921).
10 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 12.
11 McAden v. Craig, 222 N.C. 497, 24 S.E. 2d 1 (1943); Morganstern Electric Co. v. Corapolis Borough, 326 Pa. 154, 191 At. 603 (1937).

12

Ibid.

13 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [18932 1 Q.B. 256. The Carlill case involved a
unilateral offer. Nevertheless, the case is generally cited as standing for the proposition that an
acceptance of an offer to enter a bilateral contract must be communicated to the offeror. Lindley,
L.J., states on page 262 of the opinion: "Unquestionably, as a general proposition, when an offer
is made, it is necessary in order to make a binding contract, not only that it should be accepted,
but that the acceptance should be notified."
14 A new machine used for business communications by which messages may be typed out
and received almost instantaneously on a similar machine.
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Lindsel" to reach what was thought to be a sound theoretical and practical
conclusion. Thus, cases purporting to follow Adams v. Lindsell held that where
the offeror has expressly or impliedly authorized a specific channel of communication, a contract is completed the moment the acceptance is deposited in the
authorized channel. 6 As a result, the place where the acceptance is deposited
is the place of the making of the contract." This appears as an apparent
exception to the normal rule of bilateral contracts requiring communication
of the acceptance.
Since a majority of modern commercial transactions involve negotiations
between parties distant from each other, the exception has become much broader
in application than the general rule itself. Whether by analogy to the mail
cases or for practical reasons, almost without dissent the courts find that it
A more difficult problem arises in
governs telegraphic communications."
determining whether the exception logically applies to telephonic communica-9
tions. In the United States both federal and state courts hold that it does.1
Because of the different
The English judiciary has ruled to the contrary."
result, it may be well to examine the practical and theoretical reasons given in
the postal and telegraph cases to determine whether the extension to the telephone cases is warranted.
A major theoretical difficulty that had to be resolved in the postal and
telegraph cases was the apparent lack of requisite mutuality of assent necessary
for the formation of a bilateral contract. A legal paradox was created in that
the court on the one hand held that posting a letter of acceptance formed a
contract, and yet at the same time declared that acceptance must be communicated. A solution to this inconsistency has been sought in the law of agency."
Courts employing the fiction reasoned that the offeror had made the post office
his agent, and therefore the offeree in giving his acceptance to the agent was
15 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818). The doctrine of a continuing offer
through the objective approach to contracts was first clearly stated in this case. Broadly interpreted, it holds that where the offeree has reason to believe that the offer is open because the
offeror has not outwardly shown that he did not intend to keep the offer open, the offeree's power
of acceptance continues till the acceptance.
16 1 WILLISTON. CONTRACTS § 81 nn. 3, 4.
17 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1905);
Machese Bros. v. A. Lyons & Sons,
123 Cal. App. 2d 193, 266 P. 2d 556 (1954); Ward Lumber Co. v. American Lumber & Mfg. Co.,
247 Pa. 267, 93 At. 470 (1915); Hamilton v. Lycoming Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 339 (1847);
Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co., 15 R.I. 380, 5 Atd. 632 (1886).
18 Cowan v. O'Connor [1888) 20 Q.B.D. 640; Dick v. Vogt, 196 Okla. 66, 162 P. 2d 325
(1945); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gardner, 278 S.W. 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). But see
Schiff v. Schiff, 45 N.E. 2d 132, rehearing denied 48 N.E. 2d 139 (Ohio App. 1942).
19 Cases cited notes 1 and 2 supra.
20 Entores, Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp., [1955] 2 All E.R. 493 (A.C.).
21 Household Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, [1879] 4 Ex. D.

GEORGETOWN L. J. 106 (1949);

15 CORNELL L. Q. 273 (1930).
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constructively communicating with the principal. 2 Little consideration is
needed to see that the post office is no one's agent. None of the elements of
agency are present, i.e., there is no authorization by and no control in the
offeror; nor has the postal service an intent to act as agent. Such a rationale
seems strained, and no attempt has been made to apply it to the telephone cases.
Other courts have denied that a manifestation of acceptance must be
communicated to the offeror at all. In White v. Coriles 23 it was stated:
"We understand the rule to be, that where an offer is made by one party
to another when they are not together, the acceptance of it by that other must
be manifested by some appropriate act. It does not need [sic] that the acceptance shall come to the knowledge of the one making the offer before he shall
be bound. But though the manifestation need not be brought to his knowledge
before he becomes bound, he is not bound if that manifestation is not put in
a proper way to be in the usual course of events, in some reasonable time
communicated to him." 24
Justice Holmes advanced another theory to justify the intended result.
He maintained that the depositing of the letter of acceptance in the mail is
"the doing of an overt act, which by general understanding renounces control
over the letter." 25 This has been seriously questioned also, and in one case
it has been held that with the change in the postal regulations, permitting the
sender to recall and withdraw his letter, the "effective on dispatch" holding is
now at an end."

"The acceptance, therefore, is not final until the letter reaches destination, since the sender had the absolute right of withdrawal from the post office,
and even the right to have the postmaster at the delivery point return the letter
at any time before actual delivery."

27

This seems a strong argument that the ruling in the mail cases should be
universally changed or at least limited in application.
The rationale of the more recent cases is that when the offeror chooses
the mail to negotiate a contract, his selection indicates to the offeree that the
offeror is willing to be bound before he receives communication of the acceptance, i.e., that if the offeree wants to accept, all he need-do is post acceptance
22 Household Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, supra, note 21.
2346 N.Y. 467 (1871).
41d. at 469.
25 Holmes, THE COMMON LAW, 1882, p. 306.
26
Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. Cl. 1955); See also Dick
v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 94, 82 F. Supp. 326 (1949).
27 Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, supra at 419.
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and a contract is formed immediately. "8 Whether this is a realistic interpretation
of the offer seems questionable. Can it reasonably be said that the offeror
intends to assume all risks or that he is willing to have a contract come into
existence when acceptance is mailed? The more reasonable and accurate
statement of his intention seems to be to the contrary, that he does not intend to
be bound until he receives an answer. Obviously, when extended to the
instantaneous modes of communication, application of the rationale of the
recent cases becomes more difficult. When a telephone is used, the offeror
seems to retain his right to receive acceptance just as fully as he does when
all the bargaining is conducted face to face. In such a case the risk of being
heard is placed upon the acceptor, the contract being formed when and where
the offeror hears or ought to hear the acceptance." The acceptor knows that
the offeror is listening to hear, and in accepting it is incumbent on him to make
the offeror hear." If it is essential that the offeror hear what is said to him,
or at least be guilty of some fault in not hearing, the time and place of the
formation of the contract is not when and where the offeree speaks, but when
and where the offeror hears, or ought to hear."'
"It may be forcibly argued that making a promise is something which
necessarily requires communication, and that sending a letter which never
arrives is no more making a promise to the person addressed than talking into
a telephone when there is no connection with the person addressed .... 32
Various practical reasons have been advanced in an attempt to justify
the mail cases. The reason most often given is that such a rule is necessary
for business expediency. To hold that no contract results until receipt by
the offeror would create uncertainity in the offeree's mind, not knowing when
and where a contract would come into existance?8' Thus, "an acceptor would
28 This idea seems to have originated in Household Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant,
[1879] 4 Ex. D. 216, where Bramwell, L.J., stated on page 233 that "there might be an agreement
that the acceptance of the proposal may be by sending the article offered by the proposer to be
bought, or handing out a flag or sign to be seen by the offeror as he goes by, or leaving a letter
at a certain place, or any other agreed mode, and in the same way there might be an agreement
that dropping a letter in a post pillar box or other place of reception should suffice." In Entores,
Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp. [1955] 2 All E.R. 493, Lord Justice Parker prefers to treat the use
of the mail or telegraph as an indication by the offeror of a waiver of his right of communication
arising out of the general rule of the Carlill case. An offeror, opines Parker, ordinarily has a right
to receive an acceptance before he is bound, but this right may be waived. According to Parker,
such a waiver occurs upon selection by the offeror of the postal or telegraphic channel of negotiation.
Therefore, when the offeree deposits his message of acceptance with the post office or telegraph
company, a contract is formed immediately. But such waiver is not intended where an instantaneous
mode of communication is employed.
29 1 WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS

§

82.

Contra,

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 326,

com-

ment c, which is dictum in Bank of Yolo v. Sperry Flour Co., 141 Cal. 314, 74 p. 855 (1903).
3075 CENTRAL L. J. 71 (1912).
38 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 82.
82 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§

81.

38 Household Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, [1879] 4 Ex. D. 216.
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never be entirely safe in acting upon his acceptance until he had received
notice that his letter had reached its destination." " But this practical argument is not applicable to a medium of communication which is instantaneous.
For when a telephone is used, communication can be verified without delay.
Another argument advanced is that some instant during the course of the
negotiations must be chosen as the time a contract comes into being. However,
the argument seems to be one for making a choice, but not for making a particular choice. Therefore, the choice made is arbitrary.
Another of the practical arguments brought forward is that where the
contract is negotiated by mail, one of the parties must carry the risk of loss
caused by price fluctuations and the inconvenience of not knowing at what
moment to begin performance. Because the offeror selected the mode of
communication, this burden is placed on him. Although the reason is said
to be an arbitrary one, it is a reasonable one in that it permits business transactions to be closed more quickly and enables more prompt performance."
But different circumstances are present where an instantaneous medium of
communication is employed.
The strongest practical argument advanced in favor of the "effective on
dispatch rule" is that such a holding is desirous for reasons of maintaining uniformity of law among the federal and state jurisdictions. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recognizes that the telephone is more analogous to situations
where the parties are in praesentes and that it represents a sound theoretical
view. 6 Nevertheless the Linn case was decided in the light of the cases which
were felt to represent the weight of authority. The court acknowledged the
problems a contrary decision would pose. To hold otherwise would create
variations in the law which are themselves a potent cause of uncertainty and
fertile area of forum shopping." To avoid the confusion in the commercial
law, the court seemed to reason that the factors in favor of uniformity outweighed those favoring limitation of the "effective on dispatch rule" for
theoretical reasons. It would appear that no real harm is done by establishing
this rule on a desire to maintain uniformity of the law among states. And if
the purpose of having such a rule is to let businessmen know in advance what
the courts will do, it is probably best that those state courts which have not
decided the question should follow the majority even if the rule has no
34 d. at 224.
35 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS

§

78.

36 392 Pa. at 62, 139 A. 2d at 640.
37 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 326, comment c, states that "When acceptance is to

be given by telephone, the place of contracting it where the acceptor speaks his acceptance,"
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practical or theoretical basis and even if the telephone problem is not analogous
to the mail problem.
In summation, it can be said that the theoretical and practical reasons
given for the purported rule of Adams v. Lindsell are questionable. However,
the distortions of that decision have such legal longevity that it is necessary to
accept them. Such a conclusion does not preclude, however, a rational attempt
to limit their operation. But, instead, by analogy, the rule has been extended
to the other communication systems. While the similarities between the
mail and the telegraph may warrant the formulation of analogous principles of
law governing acceptance of offers, perhaps there is no such resemblance between communications by mail and the telephone.88 Indeed, a contract made
by telephone presents a greater analogy to a contract made where the parties
are in each other's presence." The circumstances involved warrant distinction
rather than analogy to the mail cases. Since all the cases deciding the issue
involves a question of jurisdiction, the question of risk of being heard was not
presented. This may explain why the cases are singularly lacking in discussion
of the principles involved. If not expressed, implicit in them is the attempted
analogy to the rule in the postal cases, that the dispatching is the last act
necessary for the formation of the contract.4"
It could be concluded that the rule set forth in the Linn case is justified
for reasons of uniformity in resolving questions of jurisdiction. This reasoning
does not apply where the question is one of formation of a contract as where the
offeror is unable to hear the offeree's reply over the telephone. • It should be
noted, however, that under the ruling in the mail cases, it has been held that
even though the letter is lost in the mail and the offeror is unaware that his
offer has been accepted, he is bound. 4 A contrary rule would seem more
rational in the telephone cases, especially where the offeree selects the mode
of communication by telephoning the offeror.
JAMES S. ROUTCH
88 1 WILLISTON. CONTRACTS § 82.
89 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 65, states that "Acceptance given by telephone is governed by
the principles applicable to oral acceptances where the parties are in the presence of each other."
However, this black letter law seems ambiguous and is without comment. When interpreted with
other pertinent sections, it can be construed to support either contention.
402 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 326.2 (1935); see notes 1 and 2 supra.
41 Vasser v. Camp, 11 N.Y. 441 (1854);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 64.

